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The paper analyzes how various preferential trading arrangements deal 
with agriculture liberalization and examines a few case studies highlighting the 
provisions on agriculture.  It assesses the effect of preferential trade agreements on 
agriculture trade flows in the case of ASEAN.  It finds that while the tariff reduction 
on all goods, including agriculture, in ASEAN provides a marked advantage from the 
MFN tariff rates, intra-ASEAN agriculture trade have not been all that significant.  
Most of the growth in the intra-ASEAN trade had come from trade in industry; and if 
total agriculture trade had expanded, much of it was due to trade outside the region.  
The paper argues that AFTA, by original design, had not really been made to boost 
intra-regional agriculture trade, but rather to facilitate the inter-industry trade arising 
out of the vertically integrated network of manufacturing transnational corporations. 
 
   3
Table of Contents 
 
 
Executive Summary........................................................................................ 2 
1.Introduction.................................................................................................. 4 
2. Preferential Trading Agreements and Agriculture ..................................... 5 
Number and Motivation .............................................................................. 5 
Treatment of agriculture in Asian PTAs..................................................... 6 
i. Market access negotiations only........................................................... 6 
ii. Exclusions and extended timelines...................................................... 7 
iii. Use of applied tariffs .......................................................................... 7 
iv. Safeguards and non-tariff measures.................................................... 7 
Focus on selected PTAs .............................................................................. 8 
i. AFTA ................................................................................................ 8 
ii. China-ASEAN (CAFTA)................................................................ 10 
iii. Korea-Chile.................................................................................. 12 
iv. Thailand-Japan............................................................................. 13 
Preferential Trading Arrangements versus Multilateral Trade................. 16 
3. Effect on Agriculture Protection Structure............................................... 16 
Mean and Median Tariffs.......................................................................... 17 
Tariff Distribution ..................................................................................... 19 
Imposed Tariffs ......................................................................................... 21 
i. Export-weighted tariffs................................................................... 22 
ii. Incidence  on  top exports................................................................. 25 
Relative Tariff Ratio (RTR) Index............................................................ 27 
4. Effect of AFTA on Trade.......................................................................... 30 
What past studies say?............................................................................... 30 
Growth in intra-ASEAN trade................................................................... 33 
i.  Growth in intra-ASEAN trade due to industry trade...................... 34 
ii.  Growth in total agriculture trade due to extra-ASEAN trade ............ 36 
iii. Individual  country differences........................................................ 37 
Non-tariff Measures .................................................................................. 40 








   4
1.Introduction 
 
In all trade negotiations, opening domestic agriculture market is always a 
sensitive issue.  Even though agriculture takes a relatively small share of Gross Domestic 
Product compared to manufacturing and services, the sector manages to slow or derail 
even a most promising trading arrangement.  Deadlock in the recent Hong Kong WTO 
Ministerial Conference is one illustration of how disagreements over agriculture can 
block further progress towards any new agreement.  In ASEAN6
1,  agriculture is, on 
average, only slightly over 10 percent of 2003 GDP compared to about 40 and 50 percent 
share of industry and services, respectively, yet, the initial hesitation over China-ASEAN 
trade pact was largely due to agriculture concern.  The Japan-Singapore Agreement, 
despite very little threat of agriculture export from Singapore, still incited Japanese 
farmers’ protest. Korean farmers’ concern threatened to scuttle the Korea-Chile 
agreement, and the fate of several other negotiations, like Japan-Korea FTA, remain 
uncertain primarily due to agriculture.  
 
A major reason why agriculture holds so much sway in the political calculations 
of various countries is, perhaps, the fact that despite its minimal share in the economy, 
agriculture’s share in employment remains significant.  In ASEAN, because more than a 
third of individual country employment is in agriculture, protection of agriculture 
employment becomes a primordial concern.  In the case of developed countries where the 
employment share of agriculture is almost trivial, intense lobbying of agriculture groups, 
nevertheless, make governments circumspect. Countries may cite non-trade  reasons such 
as food security, food safety and quality, or the so-called ‘multifunctionality’ of 
agriculture, but the true reason is the difficult political economy of liberalizing 
agriculture.  In Europe, maintenance of ‘rurality’ as a societal preference, along with an 
aging farmers’ population, is used to justify the use of agriculture subsidies; yet, subsidy 
is, in fact, a cheaper alternative to government payout for relocation of agricultural 
unemployment.  
 
Agriculture negotiation is a difficult issue everywhere, but more so in the 
multilateral forum where many developing countries vowed to indefinitely stall 
negotiations unless they get more favorable concessions in agriculture market access in 
developed countries.  As a result, regional and preferential trading arrangements 
(henceforward, PTAs) negotiations escalated after the Seattle and Doha Round, with the 
aim of advancing market liberalization ahead of the multilateral process.    
 
What are the liberalizing measures in agriculture in these PTAs and how they 
have actually affected agriculture trade is the question this paper tries to explore. In 
particular, it takes a look at the common features of PTAs in East and Southeast Asia as 
far as agriculture is concerned, and examines a few selected trade agreements in more 
detail.  The paper is organized as follows: the next section discusses how various 
preferential agreements in the region deal with agriculture liberalization – their timelines, 
type of flexible arrangements, as well as safeguards and non-tariff measures.  Because 
                                                 
1 ASEAN6 countries are Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand.   5
most Asian countries have been avid supporters of multilateral negotiations, bilateral and 
regional trading agreements are relatively recent in the region, hence not yet susceptible 
to a historical assessment of trade effects of the PTA.  For deeper data analysis, therefore, 
the paper focuses on the oldest and the first PTA that was formed in the region. Sections 
3 and 4 next discuss the effect of one specific PTA, the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) 
on regional protection structure and agriculture trade flows, respectively.  Section 5 
summarizes and concludes. 
 
2. Preferential Trading Agreements and Agriculture 
Number and Motivation 
 
Preferential trade arrangements now appear to be a permanent feature of the 
multilateral trading system.  While there were few PTAs before the Uruguay Round, the 
number has escalated since year 2000 when the multilateral negotiations went into a 
virtual crawl.  According to the list of WTO notified partnership agreements, half of the 
total PTAs were forged over the last five years.
2  The PTA fever has affected practically 
all countries, from the Asian to the African continent, but Asia Pacific and Latin 
American countries appear most aggressive. Of the 89 WTO-notified PTAs, a quarter 
involve an East Asian country and counting, as 17 more PTAs involving an East Asian 
country are under negotiations (see Table 1 and Appendix Table 1), of which, 15 are 
bilateral trading arrangements.   
 
Table 1. Preferential Trading Arrangements    
     
           
     Number 
           
     
 WTO  Notification  (1948-2005)    180
 WTO  Notification  (2000-2005)    89
  PTAs in Southeast And East Asia (2000-2005)    22
  Southeast and East Asia (1990-2005)    24.72
     
  Notification for Southeast and East Asia (1990-2005)    23
  Under Negotiation for Southeast Asia and East Asia (1990-2005)    17
           
Source: Regional Trade Agreement Gateaway, www.wto.org and RTA-BTA Database, UNESCAP 
 
 
The rush to partner up with other countries or regions in trade has affected even  
erstwhile ‘multilateralists’ like Japan and Korea. Following the lead of the European 
                                                 
2 Seventy-five percent of all PTAs notified in the WTO are bilateral trade agreements; some of which are 
cross-regional, like Japan-Mexico, while other RTAs are expanding and embracing whole continents, e.g. 
Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) (still under negotiations).   6
Union and the US, these two have entered into the PTA-forming bandwagon as a 
defensive stance to secure  and protect market access and as insurance against a possible 
failure of the WTO consensus.  Korea is aggressively pursuing PTAs with scores of 
trading partners and hopes to sign 15 of them in year 2007.  Australia, too, fears being 
marginalized if the ASEAN plus Three becomes a reality and, thus, forged a tie-up with 
Singapore as a toehold in the region.  
Other reason for initiating free trade agreements is political.  China, for instance, 
courted ASEAN, largely as a confidence-building measure, to ease ASEAN concerns 
over China as a regional threat and rival by providing preferential access to its domestic 
market. At the same time, it eyes ASEAN natural resources and large internal market, 
while seeking to improve geopolitical clout in the region and to counterbalance Japan’s 
and US influence (Chia, 2004).  Japan followed suit to preserve its influence in the region 
and to avoid future exclusion from the $700 billion ASEAN market. Even the US 
launched its Enterprise for ASEAN Initiative, in response to the Chinese dalliance with 
ASEAN, in order to lock in its security relationships in the region. 
 
Whatever the initial motivations, many of the PTAs in Asia have gone beyond 
WTO provisions.  For instance, the Japan-Singapore agreement, considered to be a 
template for Japan’s bilateral agreements with other ASEAN countries, includes chapters 
on regulatory trade regimes like competition and investment policy that had been rejected 
in previous WTO rounds. It should, however, be underscored that though these chapters 
are included, in many cases, they merely state an agreement to discuss these issues in 
subsequent rounds or provide capacity building grant, e.g. in competition policy, and thus 
have no major substantial divergence from the WTO. 
 
Treatment of agriculture in Asian PTAs 
 
While to some extent, some PTAs have been considered WTO-plus, for instance, 
because of restrictions on the imposition of anti-dumping measures or the inclusion of 
regulatory regimes in investments, the evidence is mixed with regard to provisions that 
touch on agriculture. As in the multilateral negotiations, agriculture is also a sensitive 
issue in bilateral and regional trade talks.  The same political economy, such as 
dependence of the rural population on agriculture in developing economies that makes 
liberalization difficult in the multilateral stage still looms large in small-group 
negotiations. In many PTAs, negotiators lock horns and face deadlocks because of 
agriculture as in the on-going negotiations in the FTAA, Japan-Australia, or Japan-Korea. 
 
          i. Market access negotiations only 
 
In the WTO, agricultural trade liberalization involves three elements – market 
access, domestic support, and export subsidies.  Various PTAs almost always only 
readily deal with market access issues, rarely with export subsidies, and almost never 
with domestic support.  Domestic support is deemed impossible to handle within the 
RTA framework because of externality problems brought about by its removal.  That is,   7
once domestic support is removed, its beneficiaries would not only be the preferential 
trading partner but all countries that trade and compete in agriculture.  Thus, the default 
arrangement is not to discuss domestic support in RTA and leave it, rather to the WTO.  
Negotiations on export subsidies, however, have prospered in limited sectors which 
parties to the agreement intensely trade with one another, as in the case of Australia-New 
Zealand trade agreement (ANZCERTA).  
 
         ii. Exclusions and extended timelines 
 
Yet, even negotiations on agriculture market access issues have not been walks in 
the park. The usual way that negotiating partners skirt the difficult issue of agriculture is 
through exclusion of whole or part of agriculture sector as well as more extended time 
lines for market liberalization relative to other goods sector. The various EU RTAs, for 
instance, routinely exclude a significant part of agriculture. Others, while including the 
agriculture sector, almost always have sensitive sectors that are either permanently or 
temporarily excluded. Others contain a liberal extension time for transition and 
adjustments, as in AFTA or Korea-Chile, or Thailand-Australia.   
 
         iii. Use of applied tariffs 
 
One positive aspect of the PTAs, however, is that the point of departure for 
negotiations is always the applied, rather than bound, tariffs unlike in the case of the 
multilateral discussions.  Since, almost all the bound tariffs of developing countries are 
much higher than applied tariffs, this negotiation strategy is already an advance over the 
WTO talks. PTAs, in essence, therefore, achieve right from the start the end-result that 
developed countries actually want from previous WTO Rounds, that is, of  bringing down 
bound rates to the actual applied rates.   
 
       iv. Safeguards and non-tariff measures
3 
 
Besides, market access issues such as extent and timing of tariff cuts on specific 
agricultural products, discussion on agriculture also deal with the presence of safeguards 
(that is, anti-dumping, safeguards, and countervailing duties), non-tariff measures, 
specially sanitary and phyto-sanitary (SPS) measures, and the appropriate design of rules 
of origin.   In general,  PTAs in Asia contain safeguards and SPS measures provisions, 
but most do not go substantially beyond the provisions of the WTO.   
 
With regard SPS measures, some PTAs have provisions for mutual recognition or 
the application of equivalence.  Some take the approach of promoting international 
harmonization or for using international standards, if one exists (e.g. Singapore-NZ). 
                                                 
3 OECD (2005) discusses in much greater depth the SPS and safeguard measures across 18 PTAs all over 
the world.   8
Korea-Chile FTA established a committee dedicated to SPS matters. Others, like China-
ASEAN, identify it as an area for future negotiation.  
 
Safeguard measures are also present in many PTAs in the region.  Japan-
Singapore and Korea-Chile adopt NAFTA-type safeguard measures during transition 
with criteria similar to WTO rules.
4  The difference is that the safeguard tariff that is 
applied is capped at the MFN tariff rate.
5  
 
Rules of origin is not a very controversial provision as far as agriculture is 
concerned, except to ensure that the products are indeed produced and harvested in the 
trading partner and not merely shipped from non-parties.  
 
We next discuss in greater detail a few selected preferential trade agreements in 
the region to get a clearer idea on how PTAs deal with agriculture issues. 
 
Focus on selected PTAs 
i.  AFTA 
 
The ASEAN Free Trade Area was signed in 1992 by Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, 
Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand. AFTA signaled to the rest of the world that the 
ASEAN’s focus had morphed from merely political and security concerns towards 
greater economic cooperation.
6 Later, four other Asian countries acceded to ASEAN: 
Vietnam in 1995, Laos and Myanmar in 1997, and Cambodia in 1999.  Considered as a 
South-South trading agreement, AFTA was notified to the WTO under the Enabling 
Clause, instead of Article XXIV GATT, which means that AFTA was not strictly obliged 
to liberalize ‘substantially all’ sectors.  Nevertheless, despite the initial exclusion of 
unprocessed agricultural product from liberalization, AFTA covered more than 89% of 
tariff lines for scheduled liberalization in 1993 (see  Table 2). 
 
 
Box: AFTA-CEPT In Brief 
 
AFTA follows a negative list approach for liberalizing tariffs using the Common 
Effective Preferential Tariff (CEPT) Scheme. In the CEPT, concessions are granted on a 
reciprocal, product by product, basis, and according to various speeds.  There are four 
lists under the CEPT Scheme – the Inclusion List (IL), Temporary Exclusion List (TEL), 
Sensitive List (SL), and General Exceptions List (GEL). Only products in the IL enjoy 
                                                 
4 NAFTA, however, does not apply safeguard actions to preferential trading partners except as part of a 
global action.  See Table 3 of OECD (2005). 
5 Further details of different agriculture-related measures can be found in Appendix Table 2. 
6 Prior to AFTA, ASEAN had preferential tariff arrangement as early as the 1970s whereby each country 
provided a margin of tariff preference for products coming from other ASEAN countries.  Member 
countries also pursued unilateral tariff liberalization in the 1980s rather than through any ASEAN 
framework   9
tariff concessions from other countries. Products in the Inclusion List (IL) were targeted 
to have tariffs brought down between 0-5% by 2002 for Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, 
Philippines, Singapore and Thailand (ASEAN6)
7 (2006 for Vietnam, 2008 for Laos and 
Myanmar, and 2010 for Cambodia).  
 
Products in the Temporary Exclusion List (TEL) do not enjoy concessions from 
other ASEAN partners until transferred to the Inclusion List, which ASEAN countries 
were obliged to do in equal batches up to year 2000.  Once in the Inclusion List, the 
transferred products are subject to the same rate of tariff reduction as other products 
(2002 for some and 2010 for others) in the case of ASEAN6 (2015 for CMLV countries).  
Sensitive and Highly Sensitive Products have different timeframes for phasing into CEPT 
Scheme as well as ending tariff rates.  The Sensitive List (SL) is for some unprocessed 
agricultural product which would be phased in between 2001-2003 with the ending tariff 
rates between 0-5% achieved by 2010
8.  Highly sensitive items may have ending rates 
higher than 5%.  For Malaysia and Indonesia, the ending rates are 20%.  General 
Exemption List (GEL) is intended to consist only of items that satisfy Article XX of the 
GATT and may be permanently excluded from tariff reductions because of national 
security reasons, protection of public morals, protection of human, animal and plant life 
and health, or the protection of articles of artistic, historic or archaeological value.  
 
Quantitative Restrictions (QRs) and Non-tariff Barriers (NTBs) are likewise to be 
removed by 2010 (ASEAN6), 2013 (Vietnam), 2015 (Laos and Myanmar), and 2017 
(Cambodia).  Rules of origin require 40 percent cumulated local content requirement. 
 
Like other PTAs, AFTA initially excluded unprocessed agricultural products 
(UAPs) from tariff liberalization but subsequently incorporated it into the CEPT, 
allowing for flexibilities like adding new Sensitive List and Highly Sensitive List 
categories. All products in the Sensitive List of ASEAN members are from chapters 1-24 
of the Harmonized System, except Myanmar which listed additional products from 
chapters 50-52 (silk worm cocoons, cotton yarn, etc). Not all UAPs, however, were 
protected.  Table 2 shows that, in 1995, out of the total 2,025 tariff lines of UAPs, more 
than 50 percent were on the Inclusion List, 377 tariff lines were on the TEL, while 261 in 
the SL. To date, only a handful of tariff lines remain in the sensitive list while the rest 
have been liberalized or are on track for eventual tariff reduction to 0-5% (see discussion 
in section 3 below on AFTA’s effect on protection structure).  
 
 
                                                 
7 Originally, the Fast Track Inclusion List had 2003 as target date, while Normal Track had 2008.  In 1994, 
the ASEAN Economic Ministers decided to accelerate all liberalization from 2008 to 2003, and further 
advanced it to 2002.  
8 Again the timeframes for CMLV are different. Vietnam phases in between 2004-2006 and has up to 2013 
to reduce tariffs between 0-5% (except for sugar which is scheduled for 2010). Laos and Myanmar can 
phase in between 2006-2008 and have up to 2015 to reduce. Cambodia can phase in all SL products 
between 2008-2010 and up to 2017 to reduce tariffs.   10




Inclusion List (IL) 40, 773 
1 89.46 
4 1,387                  125.68               31.6                  Jan 1994 - Jan 2003 2006 for Vietnam
  Fast Track 14,855             32.59          2008 for Laos PDR and Myanmar
  Normal Track 25,918             56.87          2010 for Cambodia
Temporal Exclusion List (TEL) 2, 888 
2 6.11 
5 377                     130.7                 32.9                 
  1- Manufactured and  2,496               5.28            Jan 1996 - Jan 2000
     Processed Agricultural Products
  2- Unprocessed Agricultural Products 377                  0.80            Jan 1997 - Jan 2003
  3- UAP - STEs 
8 15                    0.03            Jan 2010
Sensitive List 
6 261 
2 0.55            261                     141.15               35.5                  2001/2003 - Jan 2010 2013 for Vietnam
General Exemption 
7 467 
2 0.99            2015 for Laos PDR and Myanmar
TOTAL 2,025                397.53             100                 2017 for Cambodia
Notes
1 1993.
2 1995. In 1993, total TEL includes 3,322 tariff lines
3 for ASEAN 6
4 Total tariff lines; 1993 = 45,575
5 Total tariff lines; 1995 = 47, 252
6 Sensitive List category was added in 1995 after the 26th AEM Meeting, September 1994
7 General Exemption are products that satisfy Article XX of GATT
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AFTA is an example of how step-by-step tariff reductions, phased transitions and 
other flexible arrangements, eventually achieve agricultural liberalization which were not 
thought possible only a decade ago. Although there were a number of reversals, e.g. 
Malaysia reintroduced autos into the TEL, or major difficulties to liberalize some 
agricultural products, e.g., rice for Indonesia and the Philippines, majority of agriculture 
sector is now included in ASEAN regional liberalization.  How the gradual opening of 
ASEAN agriculture markets via tariff reductions translates to actual growth in trade is 
discussed in section 4 below. 
 
ii.  China-ASEAN (CAFTA) 
 
China and ASEAN signed a Framework Agreement on Comprehensive Economic 
Cooperation in 2002 which covers tariff elimination on goods, services, investments, 
trade facilitation, special and differential treatment, and expansion of cooperation in 
various areas.  With regard liberalization of goods CAFTA provides for three tracks: 
Early Harvest, Normal Track, and Sensitive Track. 
 
The Normal Track  follows a positive list approach, i.e., products listed by 
countries for liberalization on their own accord, and targets January 2005 up to January 
2010 for phased reduction to 0% tariffs for ASEAN6 and 2015 for CMLV.  The Sensitive 
Track follows the same positive list approach but has no negotiated timelines yet for 
liberalization.   11
 
The Early Harvest Program (EHP) has both a negative list (for chapters 1-8 of the 
HS) and a positive list for other products from other chapters. The aim is an accelerated 
tariff reduction for these products to zero percent starting January 2004 and no later than 
January 2006 (for ASEAN 6; 2010 for CMLV).  China-ASEAN emphasizes reciprocity 
for the products that are to be liberalized, whereby China matches the concessions for 
exactly the same products.   
Chapters 1-8 is approximately 10 percent of tariff lines in the HS classification.  
The products belong to categories in live animals, meat and edible meat offal, fish, dairy 
produces, other animal products, live trees, vegetables fruits and nuts.  In addition, a 
small list of additional products from other chapters is included in the early harvest. 
 
Table 3 summarizes the content of Annexes 1 and 2 of the China-ASEAN.  The 
Philippines, by opting for an inclusion list for Annex 1 ended up excluding more than 
60% of products in chapters 1-8, while other ASEAN countries have liberalized 
practically all of the chapters vis-à-vis China.  
 
  Table 3. China ASEAN FTA Early Harvest Program 
          
      Number   
  
Tariff 
Lines   
    






Annex 2 - 
Inclusion 
List   
         
 Brunei  0  510 
to match 
China  
 Cambodia 30  248     
 Indonesia  0  512  14   
 Laos  n.a. 208  0   
 Malaysia  n.a. 504     
 Myanmar  0  345  0   
 Philippines 209 
1 586  5   
 Singapore 0  510 
to match 
China  
 Thailand  0  539  2   
 Vietnam  15  510  0   
                 
  Source: China-ASEAN Framework Agreement, Annex 1 and 2 
  Note:         
 
1 Philippines chose an inclusion list instead of exclusion list for 
annex 1   
 




What is significantly different with CAFTA is that, while other FTAs skirt around 
agriculture, the agreement, instead, negotiated it upfront by having an Early Harvest 
Program which covers a significant portion of agriculture products as per the Harmonized 
System chapters. Of course, the usual flexibility applies via exclusion list. However, it   12
appears that, except for the Philippines which opted for positive list, the other ASEAN 
countries are eager to engage China with more open agriculture trade, shown in relatively 
little excluded products.  Because of the strong reciprocity condition of market access, 
the willingness to allow Chinese unprocessed agriculture products to ASEAN markets 
also reflects ASEAN interest to make inroads in the large Chinese market. In contrast, the 
Philippines, by liberalizing mainly products that are not significantly produced 
domestically also signals its relative lack of interest in penetrating the Chinese 
agricultural market.  
 
iii.  Korea-Chile 
 
Korea-Chile FTA is important for Korea, not only because it is its first bilateral 
FTA, but also because it was able to reach an agreement on agricultural products, thus 
proving the government’s commitment to the pursuit of FTAs.  In Korea-Chile, 
agriculture access was again a central issue. Yet, amidst public concern, the bilateral FTA 
contains one of the most wide ranging coverage of agriculture liberalization. 
 
The approach is negative listing with exceptions and phased tariff reductions. In 
the final result, Korean conceded 1,432 farm products with ten types of schedules for 
tariff elimination (see Table 4) but exempted rice, apples, and pears from tariff 
reductions. Manufacturing is mostly liberalized upon date of entry into force of the 
agreement, compared to only 16 percent of farm products.  The rest are to be liberalized 
in 5, 7, 9, 10, and 16 years.   In addition, grapes, the product of interest for Chile, have 
seasonal tariffs (over 10-year transition period) on May-October during Korea’s harvest 
season. Items subject to tariff rate quota (TRQ)+DDA include beef, chicken, whey, and 
plums where in-quota tariffs are eliminated and out-of-quota tariffs are at the prevailing 
tariff rates and to be renegotiated after the Doha Development Agenda (DDA) round 
(Chung, 2003).  Tariff elimination of some 373 agricultural products, about 26 percent of 
agriculture tariff lines, shall be negotiated after the end of the Doha Negotiations
9.   
 
                                                 
9 Chung (2003) highlights the fact that some products are classified with DDA, or to be negotiated after the 
Doha Round, as showing that some sectors are more pliable to liberalization at the multilateral than at the 
regional level. In exchange for the Korean exemption, Chile also permanently excluded 54 items covering 
mainly washing machine, refrigerators, sugar, wheat, and oilseeds.   13
Table 4. Korea’s Tariff Limitation Schedule
(Unit : Korea’s 10-digit HS codes, %)
Industrial Farm Forest Marine
Category Total Products Products Products Products in Description
Mixed feeds, pure-bred





Year 7 41(0.4) 1(0.01) 40(2.8) - - fruit, meat of poultry or
heading, soup, potatoes
Year 9 1(0.01) - 1(0.07) - - Other fruit juices
Tomatoes, pork,
cucumbers, kiwis
10S* 1(0.01) - 1(0.07) - - Grapes





E**** 21(0.2) - 21 (1.5) - - Rice, apples, pears
Total 11,170 9,102 1,432 237 399
Source: Chung (2003)
Notes:
* liberalization over a transitional period of 10 years on a seasonal basis
** Liberalization with tariff quota
*** Tariff elimination schedule shall be negotiated after the end of the Doha Development Agendas of the WTO
**** Customs duty applied shall not be eliminated.















The agreement relies on the WTO for most of the disciplines on safeguard and 
SPS measures.  It establishes a committee dedicated to SPS matters to facilitate the 
application of SPS related provisions and monitor compliance. It also has best endeavour 
wording for harmonization towards international standards and application of 
equivalence (OECD, 2004). Interestingly, concerned that the preferential access be 
eroded through multilateral concessions, the Korea-Chile FTA contains provisions that, 
should any party grants an MFN concession, it should consult the other party to consider 
adjustments to tariffs applied to reciprocal trade. Such type of provisions can potentially 
make bilateral agreements a stumbling block to multilateral negotiations. 
 
iv.  Thailand-Japan 
 
After hitting several snags in the negotiation, the Thailand-Japan FTA appears to 
be ready for signing within the year and to be enforced in 2006.  The main battlefront, as 





   14
Among the ASEAN countries, Thailand is the biggest exporter of agricultural and 
fisheries products to Japan, even if nearly half of its current agricultural export each year 
face market access restrictions. Predictably, Thailand pushed for greater market access 
for their farm products in the Japan-Thailand bilateral trade agreement.  But Japan finds it 
practically impossible to scrap tariff on imported rice and sugar because it would hurt the 
economies of Okinawa and Hokkaido. 
 
The compromise agreement was to exclude rice and sugar along with other 
products from the current Agreement, and to renegotiate those in five years (see Table 5).  
Chicken meat, another contentious product, however, would have its tariffs lowered from 
6 percent to 3 percent in 5 years.  In exchange for the exclusion of rice and sugar, Japan 
did not manage to pry the Thai car market wide open especially for Japanese luxury cars.  
 
While it appears that Japan proposed import tariff cuts on more than 500 food and 
farm products, actual market access benefit depends on negotiations on rules of origin 
and reduction of food safety standards in Japan
10. As of this writing, however, no 
publicly available information could be found on final agreement on rules of origin and 
safety standards, except the fact that Japan would provide technical assistance to improve 
food safety in Thailand as part of efforts to increase Thai exports of meat and other 
foodstuffs. 
 
                                                 
10 For instance, currently Japan bans import of live chickens and raw meat from Thailand for quarantine 
reasons, and only meat cooked at designated food processing facilities is allowed entry.  
   15







in-quota rate duty free
TRQ quantity year 1 - 4,000 metric tons
year 5 - 8,000 metric tons
Fresh pineapples
in-quota rate duty free
TRQ quantity year 1 - 100 metric tons
year 5 - 300 metric tons
Fresh, frozen vegetabl Tariff elimination within 5-10 years
immediate
Prepared, preserved c Tariff reduction from 6% to 3 % in 5 years
Prepared, preserved pork and ham
in-quota rate immediate reduction by 20% of MFN rate
TRQ quantity 1,200 metric tons from the 1st year
Rice bran oil  Tariff reduction by 55.5% in 5 years
Pet food  Tariff elimination in 10 years
Cane molasses  TRQ on the 3rd year
in-quota rate Reduction by 50% of out-quota rate
TRQ quantity year 3 - 4,000 metric tons
year 4 - 5,000 metric tons
Esterified Starch
in-quota rate duty free
TRQ quantity 200,000 metric tons from 1st year
B. Fishery Products
immediate
Fish Fillet and jellyfish,Tariff elimination in 5 years
fresh and frozen Mongo Ika
Prepared, preserved tuTariff elimination in 5 years
other bonito and crab
C. Forestry Products
Forestry products otheimmediate
plywood, particle board and fiberboard
Particle board and fibreTariff elimination in 10 years




Apples, Pears and Peaimmediate
B. Fishery Products
Yellowfin Tuna, SkipjacTariff elimination in 5 years
Herrings, Cod immediate
2. Exclusion or for Re-negotiation 
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Preferential Trading Arrangements versus Multilateral Trade 
 
The section has discussed the various ways that agriculture exceptions are 
accommodated in PTAs which includes permanent or temporary exceptions, flexible 
timelines for adjustments, and less stringent discussions on non-tariff measures.  
 
This special treatment of agriculture has both a positive and negative side. On the 
positive side, the ability to remove sensitive agriculture sectors out of the discussion 
allows the negotiations to move forward, to focus on other sectors that can give mutual 
benefits, and prevents it from being lengthily stalled, as in the case of the multilateral 
talks.  PTA negotiations, therefore, become simpler and faster relative to the WTO, not 
only because there are fewer parties to talk to and convince, but also because it is easier 
to agree on temporary exclusions of highly sensitive sectors.  Scolley (2003) even argues 
that for trading partners that are not competitive in agriculture, such exclusion reduces the 
trade diversion that is associated with preferential trading arrangements, hence makes the 
PTA more welfare enhancing.  Allowing exclusions, therefore, could be mutually 
beneficial. 
 
Moreover, others say that, even with the extended time for liberalization or 
permanent exclusion of sensitive agricultural products, the PTAs  still prepares the way 
for future multilateral liberalization, as they condition the political economy about the 
workability of a liberalized environment.  In fact, some RTAs reflect progress in 
traditionally difficult sectors such as rice and sugar using this extended time frame 
strategy, without which, these products would never have found their place on the 
negotiating table.  For instance, for many Asian countries, rice is a politically sensitive 
product that they would rather not put under trade negotiations, yet, under the PTAs, 
these types of product have been included in the country schedules and timelines for 
liberalization. 
 
The negative side of the PTAs is that this encourages economies to increasingly 
focus on these negotiations at the expense of their commitment to multilateralism. Given 
the thin number of government officials who are knowledgeable about trade, both PTAs 
and WTO negotiations would not receive the same adequate level of attention, with the 
multilateral negotiations normally taking the back seat.  Moreover, with different 
countries having different sensitive agricultural sectors being excluded from 
liberalization, future harmonization of different PTAs also becomes bleaker, thereby 
possibly locking countries into present-day spaghetti bowl trading system. For instance, a 
bilateral agreement that excludes rice from liberalization would be difficult to expand to 
an Asia-wide agreement unless other countries, like Thailand, would likewise agree to 
exclude rice.  
 
3. Effect on Agriculture Protection Structure 
 
This section and next discuss the effect of PTAs on protection structure and trade 
flows.  Since many of the PTAs in East Asia are relatively recent phenomena, an   17
econometric ex-post analysis of their impact on trade is not possible.  Instead, the section 
focuses only on the effect of the ASEAN FTA, the original free trade agreement in the 
region.   
 
What can be generally observed from the tables and graphs in this section is the 
significant progress in lowering tariffs in AFTA compared to each country’s MFN rates. 
To analyze the effect of AFTA on protection structure of ASEAN-member countries, we 
use the Harmonized System (HS) tariff schedules available from UNCTAD and World 
Bank. Some tariff schedules go as detailed as 10 digits, while majority go only as far as 
eight digits
11.  For computation of means and tariff distribution, we used the raw data of 
tariffs up to whatever digits were available.  But for weighted tariffs, we averaged the 
tariffs up to six-digit classification to harmonize with six-digit trade data. Since trade 
protection is not only by way of tariff, we supplement the analysis by a brief discussion 
of other non-tariff measures in section 4. 
 
Mean and Median Tariffs 
 
What is immediately evident, by looking at Figure 1, is that AFTA agriculture 
tariff has made an enormous improvement over its MFN equivalent.  While average MFN 
agriculture tariff for Philippines and Indonesia is over 11 percent, it is roughly four and 
three percent in the CEPT, respectively.  Thailand’s concessions in the CEPT is even 
more pronounced, with mean tariff of four percent compared to over 29 percent MFN. 
Singapore and Brunei, of course, have always had liberal trade policies, whether in the 
multilateral or regional stage. Our analysis of standard deviations of tariff lines (not 
shown) also confirms that CEPT had lowered the dispersion of tariffs; while average 
standard deviation of MFN tariffs is 12 percent, CEPT’s is only two percent.    
 
The fact that the Philippines and Indonesia have MFN means that are greater than 
their medians indicates the simultaneous presence of a large number of tariff lines that are 
far below the means and a few tariff lines with very high rates.  This phenomenon, 
commonly called tariff peaks, typically results from the application of very high tariffs is 
on a small group of politically sensitive products while the rest of the tariffs are kept at 
low levels.  In ASEAN, the fact that certain products like rice remain outside the ambit of 
tariff reduction illustrates the tariff peaks that still exist in AFTA.  Table 6 shows that 
whatever tariff peaks that exist, they occur in agriculture.  In Indonesia, 19 products out 
of 25 highly sensitive products – hence temporarily exempted from tariff reduction - are 
agriculture products, while another 60 agriculture products are classified under the 





                                                 
11 In the HS classification, chapters are at 2 digits, headings are 4 digits, and subheadings are at 6 digits.  
The first 6 digits are harmonized under the HS system, but countries assign the last two digits, and thus are 







Table 6. Sensitive and Exclusion Lists in AFTA       
         
   Brunei  Indonesia Malaysia  Philippines Singapore Thailand 
            
Total tariff lines        10,702        11,153        10,387        11,059         10,705         11,125 
         
Sensitive/Highly Sensitive        -               25                19               -                 -    
  Percent of total tariff lines        -              0.2              -                0.2               -                 -    
       Of which: Agriculture               19                19      
         
General Exclusion List            778            100                27               -                 -    
  Percent of total tariff lines                7                1              -                0.2      
       Of which: Agriculture             80              60          
         
Mixed rate              -                 -                   -                 -               157 
Specific rate              23              -                   -                 -                 -    
Source: Author's calculation. WITS.         
Note: For Malaysia, there in no available information regarding its sensitive and exclusion list in AFTA   
 
 




We next examine the MFN and CEPT tariff distribution.  Figure 2 shows that 
AFTA had successfully brought down tariff rates below five percent for almost 99 
percent of tariff lines (both agriculture and industry), of which almost half are already 
traded tariff-free.  In contrast, MFN applied rates appear to be relatively more 
concentrated in the five-to-20 percent range, with a few products still exceeding 30 
percent tariff rate.  In the case of Indonesia, almost five percent of products are still 
slapped the highest tariffs, in Malaysia, three percent, and in the Philippines, two percent. 
 





























































0% 0 - 5% 5 - 20% 20 - 30% > 30%
Source: ASEAN Secretariat and WITS.
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A slightly different picture emerges from the tariff distribution analysis of 
agriculture tariff lines alone (see Figure 3). Unlike Figure 2, Figure 3 shows relatively 
less concentration on the zero percent tariff in the CEPT, with the exception of Singapore 
and Brunei. Still, the CEPT is again proved to be successful in that more than 90 percent 
of agriculture products are, likewise, below five percent tariff rate. Among the ASEAN6, 
the Philippines has the most number of agriculture tariff lines (about five percent) with 
CEPT rates higher than 20 percent.   
 
MFN agriculture tariff concentration is, not surprisingly, in the higher tariff rate 
range. Malaysia and Indonesia have 76 and 85 percent of tariff lines, respectively, below 
five percent, while it is only 17 and 45 percent for Thailand and the Philippines.  The 
latter two countries also have the most number of tariff lines with the highest tariff rates: 
45 percent of agriculture tariff lines for Thailand and 14 percent for the Philippines have 
more than 30 percent tariff.  However, unlike Thailand which has around 6 percent of 
tariff lines at zero tariff, practically none enters the Philippines tariff-free. 
 






































































































0 0 - 5% 5 - 20% 20 - 30% > 30%
Source: ASEAN Secretariat and WITS
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A comparison of agriculture and industry tariff distribution within CEPT yet 
shows another interesting contrast.  Figure 4 shows that ASEAN countries liberalized 
industry faster than agriculture. The concentration of industrial goods that are traded 
tariff-free within ASEAN is higher than those for agriculture products. Moreover, less 
than one percent of industrial goods still have tariff rates higher than five percent, while 
the percentage share for agriculture is higher: for the Philippines, it is five percent, while 
for Thailand, it is close to one percent.  
 
Figure 4. Percent Distribution of CEPT Tariff Rates of Agricultural and 


















































A question that may be asked is whether ASEAN countries have brought down 
the tariff rates of ‘insignificant’ products while maintaining tariff rates high for export 
interests of partner countries in the AFTA. To evaluate if this is the case, we measure the 
export-weighted or the imposed tariffs of each country, that is, the tariff rates of the 
imposing country multiplied by the export share per tariff line of the partner economy.  
The assumption is that, if all of a country’s exports go to one partner country, the 
weighted tariff is the average amount of tariff that is faced by the exporting economy in 
that country, or conversely, the weighted tariff can show the average amount of tariff that   22
an importing country imposes on the other.  If the imposed tariff rates are higher than the 
simple tariff average, it can mean that the importing country may have lowered tariffs on 
products that are not so beneficial for the exports of the partner country, hence possibly 
reflecting a farcical tariff liberalization. Put another way, if a major export product is 
slapped a high tariff while a non-exported product a low tariff, the export-weighted tariff 
is likely going to be higher than average.  
 
i.  Export-weighted tariffs 
 
Figures 5.1-5.4, based on the comparison of simple tariff average and imposed 
tariffs, show a somewhat mixed result. The CEPT export-weighted agriculture tariffs of 
Thailand, for example, are higher than its simple average, against Singapore and 
Malaysian products, but lower for those of Indonesia and the Philippines. In contrast, the 
Philippines’ imposed tariff on Thai agriculture products is way higher than its simple 
average of 4.37, while it is lower for products from Indonesia.  Malaysia’s imposed tariff 
is highest on Indonesia.  This result may also reflect the fact that one country’s major 
exports are likewise the importing country’s major exports and protected sector, as in the 
case of Malaysia and Indonesia, or Thailand and the Philippines. Put differently, cases 
where the imposed tariff exceeds the simple average may reflect the lack of 
complementarity of agriculture exports among subgroups or pairs of ASEAN countries, 
or merely that the export interest of one country is well protected in the domestic market 
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Figure 5.1. Indonesia's Imposed Agriculture Tariff on ASEAN
Source: UNCTAD PC-TAS and WITS.
* Simple average rate
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Figure 5.2. Malaysia's Imposed Agriculture Tariff on ASEAN
Source: UNCTAD PC-TAS and WITS.
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Figure 5.3. Philippines' Imposed Agriculture Tariff on ASEAN
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Figure 5.4. Thailand's Imposed Agriculture Tariff on ASEAN
 
 
In contrast, non-ASEAN export markets like Australia, US, Korea, and Japan 
have imposed tariffs on ASEAN agriculture products that are less than the simple 
averages in these respective countries (see Figure 6).  Korea’s simple average agriculture 
tariff of 56.43 percent, for instance, is greater than imposed tariffs on Philippines, 
Malaysia, and Indonesia but lower than that on Thailand.  This shows possible 
complementarity of agriculture exports between Korea and the three ASEAN countries, 
but possible competition with Thai products. China’s imposed tariff on ASEAN (except 
the Philippines), on the other hand, are greater than its simple average tariff, which means 
that China’s domestic market is well protected from competition from ASEAN 
agriculture products. 
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ii.  Incidence on top exports 
 
Table 7 further illustrates why some countries receive higher export-weighted 
tariffs than others.  In general, the table shows that, of the top ten agriculture exports of 
each ASEAN country, most already receive CEPT tariffs of five percent or lower, except 
for a sprinkling of a few products.  These few exceptions are: Indonesia’s coffee exports 
(HS 090111) which, in Thailand, is slapped 40 percent;  Malaysia’s sugar exports 
(HS170199) which, in the Philippines, has tariff of 29 percent; and Thailand’s sugar, 
fowl, and cassava exports which receive still high tariffs in the Philippines.  The latter 
result explains why the imposed tariff of the Philippines on Thai agriculture products is 
10.5 which far exceeds its simple average of 4.37. 
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Table 7.  CEPT and MFN Tariffs of Top ASEAN Agriculture Exports 
                                   
  Product Description                 
HS 
Code  Top Ten Agricultural Exports of ASEAN  Trade Value 
Share to 
Agricultural 
Exports Malaysia   Philippines  Thailand    
       CEPT MFN CEPT MFN  CEPT  MFN    
  Indonesia                 
151190  Palm oil and its fractions refined but not chemically modified            1,392,411  0.25  5 5 5  15 0  5     
151110  Palm oil, crude                                                                             1,062,215  0.19  0  0  3  15  0  5     
180100  Cocoa beans, whole or broken, raw or roasted                                 410,278  0.07  0  0  3  3  5  27.3     
090111  Coffee, not roasted, not decaffeinated                                           250,882  0.05  0 0 5  35 40 40     
151321  Palm kernel or babassu oil, crude                                                      206,242  0.04  0 0 3  15 0  5     
240220  Cigarettes containing tobacco                                                            135,550  0.02  0 0 5  10 5 60     
180400  Cocoa butter, fat and oil                                                                   118,340  0.02  0  25  0  3  5  10     
151311  Coconut (copra) oil crude                                                                   99,368  0.02  0 5 3  10 0  5     
090411 
Pepper of the genus Piper,ex cubeb pepper,neither crushd nor 
ground                         93,203  0.02  0  0  5  12  5  30     
090240 
Black tea (fermented) & partly fermented tea in packages 
exceedg 3 kg                       90,509  0.02  5  25  0  3  5  60     
                    
       Indonesia Philippines  Thailand   
  Malaysia                 
151190  Palm oil and its fractions refined but not chemically modified            4,117,561 0.50  0  0  5  15  5  0     
151620  Veg fats &oils&fractions hydrogenatd,inter/re-esterifid,etc,ref  753,520  0.09  5  10  2.7  13.9  5  27.3     
151110  Palm oil, crude                                                                             512,078  0.06  0  0  3  15  5  0     
151329 
Palm kernel/babassu oil their fract,refind but not chemically 
modifid                       241,966  0.03  0  0  5  15  5  0     
180400  Cocoa butter, fat and oil                                                                   147,808  0.02  5  5  0  3  5  10     
151790 
Edible mx/prep of animal/veg fats&oils/of fractions ex hd No 
15.16                          121,936  0.01  1.8  5  3  15  5  30     
240220  Cigarettes containing tobacco                                                            111,143  0.01  5 15  5 10 5  60    
170199  Refined sugar, in solid form, nes                                                   96,307  0.01  0  0  28.8  34.9  5  0     
210690  Food preparations nes                                                                       90,326 0.01  5  47.6  2.7  5.9  4.9  25.7     
230660 
Palm nut/kernel oil-cake&oth solid residues,whether/not 
ground/pellet                       88,168  0.01  0  0  3  15  5  9.1     
                    
       Indonesia Malaysia  Thailand    
Philippines             
151311  Coconut (copra) oil crude                                                                   399,436  0.22  0 0 0 5  5  0    
080300  Bananas including plantains, fresh or dried                                       333,000  0.18  5 5 0 0  0 42     
151319 
Coconut (copra) oil&its fractions refined but not chemically 
modified                       105,424  0.06  0  0  0  5  5  0     
080111  Coconuts, dessicated                                                                        95,745 0.05  0  5  5  20  0  54.6     
200820 
Pineapples nes,o/w prep or presvd,sugared,sweetened,spirited 
or not                         84,279  0.05  5  5  0  10  5  60     
170111  Raw sugar, cane                                                                             62,023  0.03  0  0  0  0  5  0     
040229  Milk and cream powder sweetened exceeding 1.5% fat                    57,160  0.03  0 5 0 0  0  5    
130239 
Mucilages&thickeners nes,modifid or not,derivd from vegetable 
products                      47,167  0.03  0  5  0  0  5  20     
200940 
Pineapple juice,unfermented&not spiritd,whether or not sugard 
or sweet                      46,810  0.03  0  0  0  30  0  0     
080450  Guavas, mangoes and mangosteens, fresh or dried                         44,734  0.02  0 5 5 0  0 42       27
                     
 
 
Table 7 continued.  CEPT and MFN Tariffs of Top ASEAN Agriculture Exports 
                                   
  Product Description                 
HS 
Code  Top Ten Agricultural Exports of ASEAN  Trade Value 
Share to 
Agricultural 
Exports Indonesia  Malaysia Philippines  Thailand 
Singapore             
240220  Cigarettes containing tobacco                                                            346,687 0.13  5  15  0  0  5  10  5  60 
220820  Spirits obtained by distilling grape wine or grape marc                      161,788  0.06  0 170 0  0  5  10 5  60 
151190  Palm oil and its fractions refined but not chemically modified            126,150  0.05  0 0 5 5 5 15  5  0 
210690  Food preparations nes                                                                       108,417  0.04  5 47.6  3.2 11 2.7  5.9 5  25.7 
220410  Grape wines, sparkling                                                                      88,877  0.03  0 170 0  0  0  5 5  54.6 
210111  Coffee extracts, essences, concentrates                                           82,359  0.03  5 5 0 5 5 37.5  5  49.6 
240310 
Smokg tobacco,whether o not cntg tobacco substitutes in any 
proportion                      73,602  0.03  5  15  0  0  5  7  5  60 
220300  Beer made from malt                                                                         67,854 0.03  0  40  0  0  5  15  5  60 
190190 
Malt extract&food prep of Ch 19 <50% cocoa&hd 0401 to 0404 
< 10% cocoa                      64,866  0.02  4.7  5  2.8  5  3.1  4.3  4  18 
220830  Whiskies                                                                                    57,418  0.02  0  170  0  0  5  15  5  60 
                   
       Indonesia Malaysia Philippines    
Thailand             
100630 
Rice, semi-milled or wholly milled, whether or not polished or 
glazed                       1,572,222  0.20  0  0  0  0  S  50     
020714  Fowls (gallus domesticus), cuts & offal, frozen                            597,883  0.07  0 5 0 0  40 40     
170199  Refined sugar, in solid form, nes                                                   502,369  0.06  0  0  0  0  28.8  34.9     
170111  Raw sugar, cane                                                                             425,678  0.05  0  0  0  0  48  57.5    
160232  Fowl (gallus domesticus) meat, prepared/preserved                         379,281  0.05  0 5 0 0  5 40     
200820 
Pineapples nes,o/w prep or presvd,sugared,sweetened,spirited 
or not                         282,515  0.04  5  5  0  10  5  10     
230910  Dog or cat food put up for retail sale                                                  273,948  0.03  0 0 0 0  0  5    
210690  Food preparations nes                                                                       257,536 0.03  5  47.6  0 
11.
4 2.7  5.9     
071410 
Manioc (cassava), fresh or dried, whether or not sliced or 
pelleted                         252,468  0.03  2.5  5  5  5  35  40     
100640  Rice, broken                                                                                225,428  0.03  0  0  0  0  0  50     
Source: ASEAN Secretariat, UNCTAD - PC-TAS                     
 
 
Relative Tariff Ratio (RTR) Index 
 
  The Relative Tariff Ratio (RTR) Index, originally developed by Sandrey (2000), 
is a summary measure that helps evaluate the effects of trade liberalization in a bilateral 
negotiation. The index considers the bilateral protection between two countries where 
each tariff line of country A is weighted by country B’s total exports to the world for the 
same tariff line, and vice versa.  The index is the ratio of the country’s faced tariffs in the 
numerator and its imposed tariffs in the denominator (Jank, et.al., 2003). A ratio close to   28




The RTR’s main advantage is that it summarizes a large amount of trade flows 
and tariff level data into a concise number which is easy to interpret.  It can be an 
excellent instrument for measuring progress in PTAs. However, the index is mostly 
influenced by sensitive or major exported products and major trading partners
13. 
 
Table 8 presents the agriculture relative tariff ratio index of ASEAN agriculture 
exporting countries. The table does not reflect the level of tariffs but only their relative 
ratios.  A ratio between, say, Indonesia and Malaysia, of 1.08 means that for every 
percentage point that Malaysia faces in Indonesia (or that Indonesia imposes on 
Malaysia), Indonesia faces 1.08 points in Malaysia.  This ratio is close to one which 
indicates that the bilateral protection between the two countries is comparable.  The table 
also reveals that countries with a bigger percentage of high tariffs like the Philippines or 
Thailand tend to have CEPT RTR ratios that are less than one vis-à-vis their other 
ASEAN trading partners, whether they be agriculture or industry.  Generally, this implies 
that these countries impose higher tariffs on agriculture products than what they face in 
trade partners.  Conversely, Malaysia and Indonesia, which have all their tariffs 
practically capped at five percent, have RTR ratios greater than one, that is, they face 
more protection than what they impose. 
 
In the MFN column, the general picture is that of relatively greater domestic 
protection in ASEAN markets vis-à-vis non-ASEAN. Almost all RTRs are less than one 
meaning that ASEAN countries face relatively less protection than they impose, except 
for China and Korea in the agriculture market. Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand face 
higher relative protection in China, while Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand face 
relatively higher protection in Korea.  In industry, Indonesia and the Philippines face 
higher protection in Japan than what they impose on Japanese industrial goods, while 









                                                 






B)] wher A, B are countries, Xi are the ad valorem tariff for 
product i and Yi is the share of exports of product i in total exports, n is the number of tariff lines.  For 
agriculture RTR, n considers only the number of tariff lines considered as part of agriculture under the 
WTO definition.  The value of the numerator is the faced tariff of country A from B while the denominator 
is the imposed tariff of country A on B.  For agriculture RTR, the trade share Yi is computed as the product 
share in total agriculture export; for industry RTR, it is the share in total industry export. 
13 Jank, et.al (2003) summarize the weaknesses of RTR as including the fact that it ignores elasticity effects 
and substitution possibilities when tariff barriers are decreased.  The index does not also account for many 
non-tariff measures and subsidies, and may be unrealistic for some least developed countries.    29
 
Table 8: Relative Tariff Ratio (RTR) Index in ASEAN 4 by type of commodity 
 
Relative Tariff Ratio Index 
 Indonesia  Malaysia  Philippines  Thailand 
   CEPT  MFN  CEPT  MFN  CEPT  MFN  CEPT MFN
Agricultural Commodities               
Indonesia      0.93 1.01 0.56  0.64  0.23  0.35 
Malaysia  1.08  0.99      0.1  0.41 0.07 0.34 
Philippines 1.78  1.56  10.52  2.44      3.29  1.04 
Thailand 4.39  2.86  15.19  2.97  0.3  0.96     
Australia   0.02    0.34    0.15    0.04 
China     3.63    6.13    0.87    1.13 
Japan   0.26    0.69    1.07    0.22 
Korea   0.69    1.14    2.26    1.99 
US   0.27    2.01    0.26    0.24 
               
Industrial Commodities               
Indonesia      1.6  0.44  0.33 0.49 1.51 0.68 
Malaysia  0.63  2.28      0.33 1.43 0.96 1.51 
Philippines 3.05  2.06  3.02  0.7      2.6  0.9 
Thailand  0.66  1.47  1.04 0.66 0.38  1.11     
Australia   0.91    0.24    0.55    0.58 
China     0.89    0.42    0.51    0.6 
Japan   2.8    0.59    1.75    1 
Korea   0.65    0.18    0.39    0.32 
US    0.38   0.1   0.29    0.23 
               
All  Commodities               
Indonesia      1.52 0.47 0.35  0.48  1.07  0.62 
Malaysia  0.66  2.14      0.29 1.16 0.73 1.34 
Philippines 2.89  2.10  3.50  0.86      3.11  1.09 
Thailand  0.93  1.61  1.37 0.75 0.32  0.92     
Australia   0.53    0.30    0.54    0.35 
China     1.10    0.59    0.57    0.71 
Japan   2.90    0.89    2.52    1.41 
Korea   0.77    0.23    0.62    0.77 
US     0.38     0.14     0.28     0.24 
Source: Author's Calculation. WITS 
Note: The figures should be read as follows: Example: Column under Indonesia – for every one percentage point protection that 
Malaysia faces in Indonesia, Indonesia faces 1.08 point in Malaysia. 
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4. Effect of AFTA on Trade 
  
This section will first review the literature on PTAs’ effect on trade flows.  Most 
of these types of studies use gravity models to empirically assess the importance of trade 
agreements on bilateral exports.  Fortunately, some of these studies applied the gravity 
equation to test the effectiveness of AFTA. The section next tackles intra- and extra-
ASEAN trade in agriculture, and closes with a brief discussion of non-tariff measures. 
 
      What past studies say? 
 
Academics have always worried about trade diversion effects of preferential 
trading arrangements that, in some cases, can fully offset the positive benefits from trade 
creation.  Various empirical work using gravity models have, until recently, however, 
found net trade creation from most PTAs.  This means that the adverse impact on non-
members of the PTA (trade diversion) is more than offset by the benefits created to 
members (trade creation).  In fact, in AFTA, studies even found no necessarily negative 




Table 9 shows that various past estimates of trade diversion (normally the 
estimate of Dummy2 coefficient)
15, show that, unlike other PTAs like NAFTA that yield 
negative coefficients, AFTA shows positive ones. These results suggest that AFTA had 
not discriminated against imports from outside the ASEAN bloc and is, therefore, 








                                                 
14 Past studies also support the hypothesis of a natural trading bloc within East Asia, which includes 
ASEAN plus China, Japan, and Korea. Simulation studies show that should ASEAN plus Three (APT) 
integration takes place, Australia would find itself on the losing side, thus its intent on being included in a 
possible East Asian trading bloc. 
15 The gravity model is the key econometric technique used to examine the determinants of bilateral trade 
flows.  In brief, trade between two countries is positively related to their size and inversely related to the 
distance between them.  A number of other explanatory variables are added to this model.  Critical for trade 
creation and trade diversion tests are the PTA-specific dummy variables.  The first dummy variable takes 
the value of one when the two countries are members of the same PTA.  The second dummy variable is one 
if either country in a particular pair belongs to the PTA.  A positive coefficient on the first dummy variable 
indicates that the PTA enhances intra-bloc trade and hence is trade creating. A negative and significant 
coefficient for the second dummy variable suggests that the PTA leads to trade diversion.  The sum of the 
two coefficients indicate whether there is a net trade creation or net trade diversion, or whether the PTA is a 
building bloc or a stumbling bloc.  See Adams, et. Al. (2003) for an incisive explanation of the gravity 







Table 9.  Past estimates of trade creation and diversion effects of ASEAN–FTA 
 
      Static Estimates 
Author  Year  Dummy 1  Dummy 2  Dummy 3  2nd wave
a
      (trade creation)  (trade diversion)    
Frankel (1997)  1970–92  1.318***  0.767***    BB 
Fink and Primo Braga (1999)  1989  2.476***       
Krueger (1999a)  1986–96  0.78*  0.16*    BB 
Li (2000)  1970–92  1.311***  0.653***    BB 
Clark and Tavares (2000)  1995  1.673*  0.489*    BB 
Gilbert, Scollay and Bora (2001)  1984–98 (merch) 0.65***  0.54***    BB 
   1984–98 (manf)  0.63***  0.54***    BB 
   1984–98 (agric)  0.32***  0.45***    BB 
   1997 (services)  1.08***  1.01***    BB 
Soloaga and Winters (2001)  1986–88  0.18  0.15  0.70***  BB 
   1989–94  0.09  0.30**  0.67***  BB 
   1995-96  -1.06***  0.82***  0.99***  BB 
a Denotes whether a PTA is building block (BB) or stumbling block (SB) — the second wave  
  issue — based on ‘net trade effects’ of a PTA, that is, the sum of intra-bloc and extra-bloc effects. 
*** denotes the significance at the 1% level; ** denotes the significance at the 5% level; and * denotes 
   the significance at 10% level.   
Sources:  
Frankel, Stein and Wei (1995), Frankel (1997), Krueger (1999a), Li (2000), Clark and Tavares 
(2000), Gilbert, Scollay and Bora (2001), Soloaga and Winters (2001). As cited in Adams, R., et.al., 2003.  
Soloaga and Winter (2001) used a third dummy variable to indicate export diversion.  That is, while dummy2 is one for imports from 
extra-bloc country (country i is in the PTA), dummy3 is one for exports from extra-bloc country (country j is in the PTA). 
 
 
Part of the reasons why AFTA had shown little trade diversion could be that when 
AFTA was launched in 1993, ASEAN countries had already embarked on major 
unilateral nondiscriminatory trade liberalization.  As a result, the difference of import 
barriers against ASEAN and non-ASEAN products is low as shown in the average 
margin of preference (Table 10) for intra-ASEAN imports.  Except for Thailand,  the 
average margin of preference are in the single digit for all countries; Thailand and the 
Philippines have relatively high MFN-CEPT difference for agriculture, while Thailand 
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Table 10. Margin of Preference by type of commodities (in %) 
     
   Margin of Preference* (in %) 







     







     







Soure: Author's Calculation. ASEAN Secretariat 
*The average difference between MFN and CEPT rate 
Note: For Malaysia and Thailand, 2003 MFN rates were used 
 
 
Another possible reason is that ASEAN countries, as a whole, have been the 
production base of multinational companies, with vertically integrated operations within 
the region, for products that were ultimately destined for outside the region, specially the 
United States and Japan.  Hence, trade volumes with non-ASEAN were little affected 
after AFTA. If at all, it even facilitated trade outside the region by lowering transaction 
costs of trade in industrial inputs within ASEAN and by making the vertical integration 
of MNCs more seamless.  
 
Most of the gravity model results above, however, use total trade in the equation 
and not particularly agriculture trade.  Of these, only Gilbert, Scollay and Bora (2001) 
disaggregated the AFTA effect on agriculture, manufacturing and services trade. 
Interestingly, their empirical work reveals that while there is net positive effect on both 
agriculture and manufactures trade, the impact on agriculture declined after 1992 and is 
of more lose statistical significance.  Hence, the authors conclude that ASEAN had only 
been successful in promoting manufactures trade, but not trade in agriculture. Moreover, 
within ASEAN, net benefits had not been uniform across countries. Higher income 
ASEAN countries, especially Singapore and Malaysia, took the greatest gain in trade   33
diverted towards the region and supplied the bulk of increased inter-regional demand in 
manufactures.  
 
More recent results from gravity equations, however, are showing a different 
conclusion.  Adams and others (2003) employed a dynamic gravity model on panel data 
and found that, unlike many previous studies, trade diversion outweighs trade creation in  
most PTAs, including those that were initially found to be building blocs like AFTA (see 
Table 11).
16  With this result, they underscore the fact that many PTAs have not truly 
been liberalizing because of the many provisions, like rules of origin, that were needed to 
underpin and enforce the preferential agreement, and that were, in truth trade restricting. 
These non-tariff measures are discussed later in this section. 
 
Table 11. New evidence on PTAs as causing net trade creation or diversion
Past estimates New estimates
Net trade Net trade Net trade
creation nconclusive diversion creation trade diversion
Andean LAIA NAFTA Andean AFTA











Source: Adams, R., et.al., 2003. Trade and Investment effects of preferential 
   trading arrangements, Productivity Commission Working paper, 
  Canberra, Australia. May.  
 
 
Growth in intra-ASEAN trade 
 
While gravity models remain the better test for determining the effect of AFTA 
on trade in general, and on agriculture trade in particular, an analytical evaluation of trade 
data can supplement the models’ results. This subsection attempts to make an analytical 
presentation of how AFTA affected inter-regional trade. 
                                                 
16 Adams, et.al. employed different gravity model specification that address product differentiation and 
possible selectivity bias from exclusion of partners with zero trade.  They also made use of so-called 
dynamic dummies, and estimated a Tobit model with fixed effects to account for unobserved heterogeneity.  
Previous empirical results did not used fixed effect models which, according to Adams and others, leads to 
an omitted variable bias.  Indeed, they found that the fixed effects model removed the upward bias in the 
estimate of net trade effect of PTAs.   34
 
One of the main issues to overcome is the problem of attribution.  Was the growth 
in intra-regional trade, for instance, due to the trade agreement or to other factors?  At 
best, the answer can only be indicative.  In Table 12, for instance, in those products in 
which tariffs had been completely eliminated, ASEAN country imports from ASEAN had 
increased.  The tariff elimination may not be the only factor that can explain such growth 
nor can we be sure that these imports have taken advantaged of the PTA considering the 
burden of satisfying rules of origin requirements, but such information gives us reason to 
pause and reflect about the potential role of PTAs. 
Table 12. Intra-ASEAN Imports of Selected Countries (In thousand US dollars)
# of Tariff Lines w/
CEPT=0 Imports from ASEAN
(HS 6-digit) 2003 1999
Philippines 72 180,027               136481*
Thailand 43 20,323 16,019
Malaysia 539 1,188,935 629,868
Indonesia 223 497,258 878,654
Source: ASEAN Secretariat and UNCTAD PC-TAS
* Year 2000 figures were used
 
 
Another caveat in analyzing trade data is that a large portion of products that cross 
country borders come from illegal trade that, necessarily, does not get reflected in the 
official trade figures.  Their importance is evident in the fact that, often trade flows do not 
exhibit significant change after tariffs have been lowered because many of them have 
already managed to come inside the country tariff-free anyway. In addition, tariffs are not 
the only way by which countries protect their domestic markets.  There is a whole gamut 
of non-tariff measures that can obviate whatever liberalization that tariff reduction aimed 
to accomplish. Thus, perhaps a more apt indicator of liberalization would be the 
difference in border and home prices, i.e. liberalization’s effect is shown in decrease in 
the price difference, but data limitation precludes this paper from undertaking analysis 
through this method.  
     
We turn next to the analysis of intra-regional trade in agriculture. 
 
i.  Growth in intra-ASEAN trade due to industry trade 
 
A descriptive analysis of trade creation and trade diversion can be gleaned from 
analyzing shares of intra-ASEAN and extra-ASEAN trade to total.  From Table 13, total 
intra-ASEAN trade share to total regional trade (ASEAN6 to ASEAN10) had indeed 
increased by more than ten percentage points.  But, judging from the share of intra-
ASEAN agriculture trade to total, most of this increase had come, not from increased 
agriculture trade, but from industry trade.  Intra-ASEAN agriculture trade share to total   35
ASEAN trade increased from 1.44 percent  in 1995 to 1.9 in 2003, roughly 0.5 
percentage point increase, even as total intra-ASEAN trade share had increased from 
21.41 percent in 1995 to 31.74 percent in 2003, or by about ten percentage points. 
 
 
1995 2000 2003 1995 2000 2003 1995 2000 2003
ASEAN 6 72,511 75,393 69,518 87,634 88,476 20.23 29.25 29.61
ASEAN 10 75,237 79,140 74,994 94,047 96,504 21.41 30.92 31.74
Non-ASEAN 174,113 164,086 218,810 204,112 213,718 78.59 69.08 68.26
ASEAN 6 2,792 4,097 4,021 3,909 5,101 1.16 1.22 1.66
ASEAN 10 3,292 4,523 5,224 4,767 6,003 1.44 1.47 1.9
Non-ASEAN 7,481 7,242 18,147 6,970 10,334 4.84 2.64 3.18
Source: UNCTAD PC-TAS 
Table 13. Direction of ASEAN 6 Trade: 1995, 2000, 2003
Imports Exports Percentage Share to Total Trade










Total trade among ASEAN6 as a share to total averaged 21 percent from 1993-
2003 as compared to 79 percent for non-ASEAN6
17. Figure 7 shows the share of 
agriculture and industry to total trade, as well as the share of intra- and extra-ASEAN 
trade. It indicates that much of ASEAN trade, more than 90 percent is in industry, and 
only about ten percent in agriculture. In fact, the average growth of agriculture share to 
total trade from 1993-2003 is -2 percent while growth of industry share averaged 0.22 
percent. While this indicates that little much had changed as far as the importance of 
industry to total trade is concerned, it implies that the importance of agriculture to 
ASEAN trade had dissipated even more.   
 
Average growth of intra-ASEAN trade share to total is roughly 1.5 percent from 
1993-2003 while growth of extra-ASEAN share averaged -0.35 percent.  This, possibly, 
indicates a little trade diversion effect of AFTA but is relatively small compared to the 
growth effect on intra-ASEAN trade. Of the growth of intra-ASEAN trade, much of that 
is again accounted for by industry trade rather than agriculture.  
 
                                                 
17 Based on computation of ASEAN6 to ASEAN6 trade from ASEAN Statistical Yearbook 2004   36
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That most of the growth of intra-ASEAN trade came from trade in industry is, to a 
certain extent, not surprising.  First, as mentioned above, the ASEAN countries produce 
agriculture products that are broadly similar, i.e., mostly tropical products and, hence, 
provide relatively little room for trade with one another. Second, the AFTA itself was 
originally conceived, not to foster trade in agriculture but to facilitate the already 
burgeoning intra-industry trade in manufacturing that arose from the vertically- linked 
operations of transnational corporations in ASEAN.  The extension of AFTA to 
agriculture goods came almost as an afterthought.  Being notified in the WTO under the 
Enabling Clause, rather than under GATT Chapter XXIV, ASEAN was not under any 
obligation to satisfy the “substantially all trade” requirement, and could, therefore, 
initially exclude the entire agriculture sector.  It was only later that agriculture 
liberalization was appended in the agreement. Consequently, agriculture tariff reduction 
had been one of those carried out in more recent years, unlike some industrial goods 
which had been opened up almost from day one of the FTA.  
 
 
ii.  Growth in total agriculture trade due to extra-ASEAN trade 
 
Figure 8 shows that total agriculture trade share to total ASEAN trade
18  had been 
on the decline since 1993, and that this trend started to reverse starting 2000.  From 2000 
to 2003, total share of agriculture trade increased by almost one percentage point from 
5.7 in 2000 to 6.6 percent in 2003.  Much of this increase, however, came from extra-
                                                 
18 Figures are from ASEAN6 to ASEAN6.   37
ASEAN agriculture trade which increased its share to total trade by 0.6 percentage point 
from 4.5 in 2000 to 5.1 percent in 2003, while intra-ASEAN agriculture export share to 
total increased by merely 0.3 percentage point (from 1.2 in 2000 to 1.5 percent in 2003). 
This implies that ASEAN, as a group does not trade a lot in agriculture products among 
one another, presumably because they produce similar agriculture goods. Rather, as in 
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Year
Figure 8. Intra, Extra and Total Agricultural Trade Share: ASEAN 6 to ASEAN 6
Intra-ASEAN Agriculture trade share Extra-ASEAN Agriculture trade share Total Agriculture Trade Share
 
 
iii.  Individual country differences 
 
The apparent sluggish growth of intra-ASEAN agriculture trade of ASEAN6, 
however, masks individual country performance. While intra-ASEAN share of 
agriculture trade to total has not been very significant, its ratio to extra-ASEAN trade has 
actually grown, specially if observed at the individual country level. For example, Figure 
9 shows intra-/extra-ASEAN agriculture trade ratio trending upward, but change has been 
more pronounced for the Philippines and Thailand.  In 1995, these two countries’ ratio of 
intra-/extra-ASEAN trade were 0.11 and 0.12, respectively, while in 2003, intra-ASEAN 
trade relatively expanded to ratios of 0.22 and 0.19.  
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Similarly, intra-ASEAN agriculture share to total trade shows varied growth 
across ASEAN6, but the Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand (ASEAN4) seem 
to have reaped greater gains compared to Singapore.   In terms of growth of values of 
agriculture intra-ASEAN trade, ASEAN4 trade increased by more than double since 1992 
(see Figures 10 and Figure 11). 
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Figure 11. Intra-ASEAN Total Agricultural Trade 


















In summary, although there are individual country differences in agriculture trade 
performance, the analysis above confirms the results of many gravity trade models that 
AFTA is not trade diverting, particularly for agriculture as trade in intra-ASEAN 
agriculture products grew only marginally from 1.44 percent share to total trade in 1995   40
to 1.9 percent in 2003 (Table 13) and that most of the growth in agriculture trade is due to 
extra-ASEAN trade.
19  It also adds evidence to the Gilbert, Scollay, Bora (2001) result 
that manufacturing benefited much more from AFTA than agriculture.  However, recent 
dynamic gravity models have found that AFTA is among the PTAs that are stumbling 
blocs, i.e. the trade diversion exceeds trade creation.  This underscores the non-
liberalizing nature of PTAs due to stringent rules of origin and persisting non-tariff 
measures that are not sufficiently addressed in the agreement. The issue of non-tariff 




The pace of the removal of the tariff protection structure as shown in Section 3 
stands in stark contrast with an apparently sluggish progress in intra-ASEAN trade in 
agriculture.  One wonders whether the reason is only because ASEAN products are 
competing with each other and that there is not much scope for intra-(product) trade, that 
is, two countries exporting and importing rice, for example, or whether the problem lies 
not in tariffs but in other non-tariff measures.  Table 14 gives an indication that this is 
highly plausible. Of the many non-tariff measures in ASEAN, a good number of them are 
applied on agricultural products, particularly technical measures or health and safety 
standards requirements. At least 70 percent of tariff lines in which technical measures are 
applied belong to agriculture. It even seems that the more developed ASEAN countries 
like Singapore and Malaysia impose more of it in agriculture than other countries.  
 
Another major non-tariff measure that particularly affects agriculture trade are 
quantity control and licensing/monopolistic measures. While ASEAN has done away 
with import quotas, import licensing for some products are only given either to a 
government monopoly, as in the case of rice imports of the Philippines, or to registered 
importers.  
 
                                                 
19 A referee rightly notes that, based on previous discussions, this conclusion is true primarily because less 
(slower) liberalization has, so far, been achieved in the agriculture sector.    41
Table 14. Non-tariff measures in ASEAN
(1) (2)  (2)/(1)
Brunei (2004)
Price Control Measure 34 18 52.9
Automatic Licensing Measure 3 3 100
Quantity Control Measure 205 118 57.6
Monopolistic Measures 4 4 100
Technical Measures 49 44 89.8
Indonesia (2003)
Price Control Measure 35 1 2.9
Quantity Control Measure 259 81 31.3
Monopolistic Measures 62 25 40.3
Technical Measures 486 411 84.6
Malaysia (2003)
Price Control Measure 8 0 0
Finance Licensing 2 0 0
Automatic Licensing Measure 16 1 6.3
Quantity Control Measure 412 138 33.5
Monopolistic Measures 6 6 100
Technical Measures 215 167 77.7
Philippines (2001)
Price Control Measure 18 0 0
Automatic Licensing Measure 26 18 69.2
Quantity Control Measure 264 168 63.6
Technical Measures 339 284 83.8
Singapore (2001)
Price Control Measure 16 0 0
Automatic Licensing Measure 24 18 75.0
Quantity Control Measure 212 97 45.8
Monopolistic Measures 1 1 100
Technical Measures 264 182 68.9
Thailand (2003)
Price Control Measure 13 0 0
Finance Licensing 1 0 0
Quantity Control Measure 127 66 52.0









Further corroborating this result, Adams, and others (2003) tried to develop a 
Members Liberalization Index (MLI) for different PTAs all over the world to assess how, 
in reality, these preferential arrangements, after taking many non-tariff measures and 
rules of origin requirements into account, have made economies more free.  In essence, 
the higher is their measure of the MLI, the more liberalizing the PTA is supposed to be
20.  
Table 15 shows a portion of the index construction by Adams, et.al (2003), where AFTA 
got a total measure of only 0.035 out of a “perfect” point of 0.10 for agriculture. It is 
ranked 16
th out of 18 PTAs considered in the study.  It ranked slightly better at 14
th place 
for industry, and 11
th out of 18 PTAs for overall trade (Table 16).  Admittedly, the index 
construction entails some amount of subjective judgment but the low ranking for 
                                                 
20 The actual computation of the MLI, taken from Adams, et.al. (2003), is shown in the Appendix.   42
agriculture, nevertheless, is telling of lack of actual liberalization in agriculture within the 
region. This can, perhaps, partly explain why intra-ASEAN agricultural trade did not 
significantly increase at close to the same pace as industry did.  
 
Singapore-NZ 1 1 1
E U 262
ANZCERTA 3 2 4
Chile-MERCOSUR 4 4 3
Chile-Mexico 5 3 6
NAFTA 6 11 10
EU-Poland 7 7 13
ANDEAN 8 5 5
M E R C O S U R 987
Chile-Columbia 10 13 9
ASEAN-FTA 11 16 14
E F T A 1 298
P A T C R A 1 31 01 2
I s r a e l - U S 1 41 71 5
EU-Switz 15 18 11
EU-Egypt 16 14 17
SPARTECA 17 12 16
LAIA 18 15 18
Source: Adams, 2003
Note: Rank 1 means PTA provisions contain very liberalizing elements
Table 16. Ranking of Preferential Trading Arrangements
All trade Agriculture Industry
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5. Summary and Conclusions 
 
The paper showed that, in the case of AFTA, the preferential agreement helped 
accelerate the bringing down of tariff barriers against other ASEAN countries.  The 
average and median CEPT tariffs have gone down significantly compared to the MFN 
levels. The tariff distribution analysis shows that tariffs of a large chunk of agriculture 
products, and indeed of all commodities, have been capped within zero to five percent, 
while in the MFN, a large portion of tariffs still lie between five and 20 percent. Major 
ASEAN export interests are neither prevented entry into each other’s domestic markets 
by high tariffs, except for products like rice, sugar or coffee.  
 
The analysis of relative tariff ratio index reveals ASEAN agriculture tariff 
protection is relatively high with respect to those of developed countries, except China 
and Korea. Developed countries, except Japan, are, likewise, relatively more open when 
it comes to industrial exports.  However, they may have very low tariff barriers in 
agriculture, but various non-tariff measures, not captured in the above tariff analysis, 
work to the disadvantage of developing countries like those from Southeast Asia.  Even 
among ASEAN, itself, much of the non-tariff measures, particularly health and safety 
standards, import licensing and quota measures, are applied more especially on 
agriculture products which, perhaps, partly explain the relatively low growth of intra-
ASEAN agriculture trade over total inter-regional trade.  Still, the paper highlights the 
individual country performance in improving trade with other ASEAN. 
 
Our discussion of specific PTAs’ treatment of agriculture also shows that while 
agriculture products remain sensitive and are given special treatments like prolonged 
timetable for liberalization, the fact that PTAs manage to include many sensitive products 
in the schedule of liberalization should be considered an advance over multilateral 
negotiations. It is understandable that some countries, for political reasons, would have 
greater difficulty opening up certain agricultural sector.  But the flexibility afforded them 
in preferential trading agreements make for a less painful transition process.  At the same 
time, the fact that these countries commit the liberalization of even difficult sectors is a 
major improvement over the multilateral negotiations. What is now needed are time and 
patience to see to it that those commitments are observed and not eventually withdrawn 
through policy reversals. 
 
In the final analysis, the answer to the question of whether PTAs are stumbling or 
building blocs to multilateral liberalization depends much on the design of the trade 
agreements, the sector inclusiveness, timetable, and flexibilities that are agreed upon.  In 
the case of AFTA, the answer remains it being a building bloc as far as total trade is 
concerned.  But whether AFTA is also a building bloc when it comes to agriculture trade, 
an affirmative answer, so far, may be less enthusiastic. Considering that many tariffs in 
agriculture were lowered later than other goods, a few more years may be needed to see 
its real effect on agriculture trade within the region.  
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ASEAN- Chile- Chile- Chile- Singapore-
FTA Colombia MERCOSUR Mexico NZ
Measures covering trade in agriculture
Technical barriers to trade 0.0021 0.0006 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0030 0.0000 0.0003 0.0000 0.0021 0.0012 0.0021 0.0021 0.0000 0.0021
Export incentives 0.0000 0.0060 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0060 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0030 0.0000 0.0030 0.0060 0.0060
Safeguards 0.0010 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0020 0.0000 0.0020
S a f e g u a r d s  –  t i m e  l i m i t 0 . 0 0 2 00 . 0 0 1 50 . 0 0 0 00 . 0 0 0 00 . 0 0 0 00 . 0 0 0 00 . 0 0 0 00 . 0 0 0 00 . 0 0 0 50 . 0 0 0 00 . 0 0 0 00 . 0 0 0 50 . 0 0 0 00 . 0 0 0 50 . 0 0 0 00 . 0 0 2 00 . 0 0 1 00 . 0020
Safeguards – type of measure 0.0020 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0015 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0015 0.0015 0.0000 0.0015 0.0000 0.0020 0.0015 0.0020
Antidumping and countervailing 0.0000 0.0000 0.0030 0.0000 0.0030 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0030 0.0000 0.0000 0.0030 0.0000 0.0030 0.0000 0.0045 0.0000 0.0045
Years remaining in tariff reductions 0.0040 0.0040 0.0040 0.0000 0.0040 0.0040 0.0000 0.0040 0.0040 0.0040 0.0000 0.0040 0.0040 0.0004 0.0028 0. 0 0 0 40 . 0 0 4 00 . 0 0 4 0
Tariff quotas 0.0153 0.0153 0.0153 0.0000 0.0153 0.0153 0.0153 0.0153 0.0153 0.0043 0.0000 0.0153 0.0153 0.0085 0.0153 0.0153 0.0153 0.0153
D o m e s t i c  s u p p o r t 0 . 0 0 0 00 . 0 1 6 20 . 0 1 6 20 . 0 1 6 20 . 0 1 6 20 . 0 1 6 20 . 0 1 6 20 . 0 1 6 20 . 0 1 6 20 . 0 1 6 20 . 0 1 6 20 . 0 1 6 20 . 0 1 6 20 . 0 1 6 20 . 0 0 0 00 . 0 1 6 20 . 0 1 6 20 . 0 1 6 2
Tariff exceptions 0.0100 0.0000 0.0100 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0100 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0100 0.0050 0.0050 0.0100
Number of different types of ROO 0.0020 0.0000 0.0010 0.0005 0.0000 0.0005 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0010 0.0010 0.0010 0.0000 0.00100 . 0 0 0 50 . 0 0 0 0
C o v e r a g e  o f  R O O 0 . 0 0 3 00 . 0 0 0 00 . 0 0 3 00 . 0 0 3 00 . 0 0 3 00 . 0 0 0 00 . 0 0 3 00 . 0 0 3 00 . 0 0 3 00 . 0 0 3 00 . 0 0 3 00 . 0 0 3 00 . 0 0 3 00 . 0 0 0 00 . 0 0 3 00 . 0 0 3 00 . 0 0 0 00 . 0 0 3 0
R e s t r i c t i v e n e s s  o f  R O O 0 . 0 1 0 00 . 0 0 2 00 . 0 0 2 00 . 0 0 1 00 . 0 0 2 00 . 0 0 2 00 . 0 0 1 00 . 0 0 6 00 . 0 0 2 00 . 0 0 5 00 . 0 0 4 00 . 0 0 2 00 . 0 0 2 00 . 0 0 2 00 . 0 0 0 00 . 0 0 0 00 . 0 0 2 00 . 0 040
SPS measures 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0150 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0075 0.0150 0.0000 0.0150 0.0038
T O T A L 0 . 0 5 1 40 . 0 4 5 60 . 0 5 4 50 . 0 2 0 70 . 0 4 5 00 . 0 3 8 00 . 0 3 5 50 . 0 4 4 50 . 0 6 8 00 . 0 3 2 50 . 0 3 5 00 . 0 4 6 50 . 0 4 3 60 . 0 4 4 80 . 0 4 8 20 . 0 5 6 50 . 0 6 6 50 . 0 7 4 9
R A N K 6 9 51 81 01 41 51 2 21 71 6 81 31 1 7 4 3 1
Source: Adams, R., et.al., 2003. Trade and Investment effects of preferential trading arrangements, Productivity Commission Working paper, Canberra, Australia. May.
Table 15.  Trade in Agriculture Liberalisation Index














   45
References 
 
Adams, R, P. Dee, J. Gali and G. McGuire. 2003. “The Trade and Investment Effects 
  of Preferential Trading Arrangements: Old and New Evidence”, Productivity 
 Commission  Staff  Working Paper, Canberra 
 
Abbot, P. 2002. “Tariff Rate Quotas: Failed Market Access Instruments?”. European 
Review of Agricultural Economics. Vol 29(1).  
 
Anderson, K. and W. Martin. 2005. “Agricultural Trade Reform and the Doha 
 Development  Agenda.” WPS 3607. World Bank. 
 
ASEAN Secretariat. 1998. AFTA Reader. Vol. 5 
 
ASEAN Secretariat. 2004. ASEAN Statistical Yearbook. 
 
Burfisher, M., ed. 2001. “Agricultural Policy Reform in the WTO—the Road Ahead.” 
  Market and Trade Economics Division, Economic Research Service, U.S. 
  Department of Agriculture. Agricultural Economic Report No. 802. 
 
Chia, Siow Yue. 2004. “ASEAN-China Free Trade Area.”  Paper presented at the AEP 
  Conference, HongKong, 12-13 April. 
 
Chung, Hae-kwan (2003). 'The Korea-Chile FTA: Significance and Implications'. East 
 Asian  Review, Vol. 15, No. 1, Spring 2003, pp. 71-86 
 
Clark, X. and Tavares, J. 2000, “A quantitative approach using the gravity equation”,  
  Development Discussion Paper no. 748, Harvard Institute for International 
  Development, Harvard University. 
 
Crawford, J. and R. Fiorentino. 2005. “The Changing Landscape of Regional Trade 
  Agreements.” DP No. 8. WTO. Geneva. 
 
Feridhanusetyawan, Tubagus (2005). ‘Preferential Trade Agreements in the Asia-Pacific 
  Region’. Policy Development and Review Department IMF Working Paper. 
 
Findlay, C. 2005. “Agriculture in Australia’s Free Trade Agreements” Paper prepared for  
  a workshop prior to the Annual Conference of the Australian Agricultural and 
  Resource Economics Society, on Trade Policy Reform and Agriculture, Coffs 
 Harbour,  8  February. 
 
Fink, C. and Primo Braga, C.A. 1999, ‘How stronger protection of intellectual property  
  rights affects international trade flows, The World Bank Working Paper no. 2051, 
  World Bank, Washington DC, 
 URL:http://www.worldbank.org/html/dec/Publications/Workpapers/wps2000seri   46
  es/wps2051/wps2051.pdf (accessed January 2002). 
 
Frankel, J. 1997, Regional Trading Blocs in the World Economic System, Institute for  
  International Economics, Washington DC. 
 
Frankel, J. and Wei, S. 1993, ‘Trade blocs and currency blocs’, NBER Working Paper 
  No. 4335, National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge. 
 
Frankel, J. Stein, E. and Wei, S. 1995, ‘Trading blocs and the Americas: The natural, the 
  unnatural, and the super-natural’, Journal of Development Economics, 47(1), pp. 
 61–95. 
 
Gilbert, John. Scollay, Robert and Bora, Bijit. 2001. “Assessing Regional Trade 
  Agreements in the Asia-Pacific.” Policy Issues in International Trade and 
  Commodities Study Series, No.15. United Nations Conference on Trade and 
 Development. 
 
Inkyo, C. and K. KyongDeok. 2005. “Assessing the Quality of FTAs and Implications for  
  East Asia” Paper presented at the PAFTAD Conference, The East-West Center, 
  University of Hawaii, February. 
 
Jank, M, I. Fuchsloch, and G. Kutas. 2003. “Agricultural Liberalization in Multilateral  
  and Regional Trade Negotiations.” Intal-ITD Working Paper SITI-03. Inter-
  American Development Bank. 
 
Krueger, A. 1999, ‘Trade creation and trade diversion under NAFTA’, NBER Working  
  Paper no. 7429, National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge. 
 
Krumm, K. and H. Kharas, eds. 2003. East Asia Integrates: a Trade Policy Agenda for  
 Shared  Growth. World Bank. 
 
Li, Q. 2000, ‘Institutional rules of regional trade blocs and their impact on international  
  trade’, in Switky, R. and Kerremans, B. (eds), The Political Consequences of 
  Regional Trade Blocs, Ashgate, London, pp. 85–118. 
 
Low, Linda (2003), “Singapore’s Bilateral Free Trade Agreements: Institutional and  
  Architectural Issues”, paper presented at the Trade Forum on “Regional Trade 
  Agreements in Comparative Perspective”, jointly organized by PECC and 
  LAEBA, Washington, DC, 23 April.  
 
Sandrey, R. 2000. “The Relative Tariff Ratio Index.” NZ Trade Consortium Working  
  Paper No.7. NZ Institute of Economic Research.  
 
Scollay, R. (2003). ‘RTA Developments in the Asia-Pacific Region: State of Play’. Paper  
  presented at the PECC Trade Forum, Phuket, Thailand, 23 May  
   47
Scollay, R. 2003. “Treatment of Sensitive Issues in RTAs: The Case of Agriculture.”  
  Paper presented at the PECC Trade Forum, Washington D.C., 22 April. 
 
Soesastro, H. 2003. “Dynamics of Competitive Liberalization in RTA Negotiations: East  
  Asian Perspectives.” Paper prepared for the PECC-LAEBA Trade Forum, 
  Washington D.C., 22 April. 
 
Soloaga, I. and Winters, L.A. 2001, ‘Regionalism in the nineties: What effect on 
 trade?’,  North American Journal of Economics and Finance, 12(1),pp.1-29. 
 
Subramanian, A. and S. Wei. 2003. “WTO Promotes Trade, Strongly but Unevenly.”  
  NBER Working Paper 10024. October. 
 
Vollrath, Thomas L. October 1998. "RTAs and Agricultural Trade: A Retrospective  
 Assessment."  Regional Trade Agreements and U.S. Agriculture, Mary Burfisher 
  and Elizabeth Jones (editors), Agricultural Economic Report 771. Economic 
  Research Service, U.S. Department of Agriculture. 
 
Wainio, J. and P. Gibson. 2004. “Measuring Agricultural Tariff Protection.” In US 
  Agriculture and the Free Trade Area of the Americas. USDA. 
 
Yung, C., Urata, S. and C. Inkyo (2005) ‘The Political Economy of the Proliferation of  
























   48
Appendices 
 
Appendix Table 1. FTAs in East and Southeast Asia 
In Force In Negotiation Under Study
A. Southeast Asia
AFTA (1993) ASEAN-Korea ASEAN-Japan
ASEAN - China (2003) ASEAN-India ASEAN-EU
Singapore-NZ (2001) Japan-Philippines ASEAN-US
Singapore-Japan (2002) Japan-Malaysia ASEAN-CER
Singapore-EFTA(2002) Japan-Thailand Singapore-EU
Singapore-Australia (2003) Japan-Indonesia Singapore-Bahrain
Singapore-US (2004) Singapore-Kuwait Singaproe-Egypt
Singapore-S. Korea (2005/6) Singapore-Panama Singapore-Iran
Singapore-India (2005/6) Singapore-South Africa Thailand-Pakistan
Singapore-Chile-NZ-Brunei (2005/6) Singapore-Pakistan Thailand-Peru
Singapore-Jordan (2005/6) Singapore-Qatar Thailand-Chile
Thailand-Australia (2005) Singapore-Canada Philippines-US








China-Hong Kong (2004) China-Malaysia China-India
China-Macau (2004) China-Australia China-Singapore
China-Macau (2004) China-New Zealand




Korea-Chile (2004)   Korea-Japan Korea-New Zealand
Korea-Singapore (signed, 2005 Apr)   Korea-Mexico Korea-China
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Appendix Table 2.  Highlights of FTAs in Select Southeast Asian Countries
 
 
Name  Approach to Liberalization  Anti-Dumping  Countervailing 
Duties  Safeguards  Technical Standards 
SOUTHEAST ASIA 
ASEAN Free Trade Area 
(AFTA) 
•  Positive List: Common Effective 
Preferential Tariff (CEPT) Inclusion 
List 
•  Tariff reduction (to 0-5% level) 
implemented in ASEAN-6, under 
way in new ASEAN members 
•  Further negotiation needed to 
include High Sensitive Products List 
under the agreement 
 
n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  (but there is an 
exclusions list) 
Creates the ASEAN Consultative 
Committee for Standards and 
Quality 
ASEAN - China Free Trade 
Area (ACFTA) 
•  Positive list 
•  Tariff elimination by 2010 for 
ASEAN-6 and China; 2015 for New 
ASEAN members 
•  Three tracks of tariff reduction: Early 
Harvest Program (EHP), both for 
negative and positive list); and 
Normal Track  and Sensitive Track, 
only for positive list 





Follow WTO principles  Follow WTO, allowed 
within 5 years of 
liberalization  
for up to 3 years (plus 
one-year extension) 
n.a. 
Singapore - Australia  Free 
Trade Agreement (SAFTA) 
•  Negative list 
•  Tariff elimination by entry in effect of 
the agreement. 
Within WTO rules. 
Detailed process to 
initiate measures. 
Within WTO rules.  Not allowed  Based on the previous Mutual 
Recognition Agreement on 
Conformity Assessment and calls 
for harmonization within APEC, 
WTO guidelines.   50
Name  Approach to Liberalization  Anti-Dumping  Countervailing 
Duties  Safeguards  Technical Standards 
 
 




•  Positive list of products covered, but 
with exceptions  
•  The FTA covers only those products 
falling within Ch. 25 through 97 of 
HS Coding System; fish/other 
marine products; and processed 
agricultural goods 





Not allowed, should 







For one year only, 
extendable to 3 years. 
 
 
Subject to WTO Agreement on 
SPS 
Singapore - India 
Comprehensive Economic 
Cooperation Agreement 
•  Positive list into India, all goods free 
into Singapore 
•  Full tariff elimination or reduction by 
2010 
•  Further liberalization through 
negotiation 
 
Allowed  following WTO  Allowed  Cooperation towards mutual 
recognition 
Agreement between 
Singapore - Japan for a New-
Age Economic Partnership 
(JSEPA) 
•  Positive list 
•  Full tariff elimination 
•  Foresees inclusion of more goods in 
the list 
n.a.  Following the WTO 
Agreement on Safeguards 
Following the WTO 
Agreement on 
Safeguards 
Calls for mutual recognition, and 
sets out the standards to register 
new conformity assessment 
bodies in the Sectoral Annexes 
Singapore - Jordan Free 
Trade Agreement 
•  Positive List 
•  Tariff elimination in 10 years. 
•  Possible acceleration through 
negotiation 
 
WTO plus  According to WTO 
commitments 
According to WTO plus 




Singapore and New Zealand 
on a Closer Economic 
Partnership (ANZSCEP) 
 






WTO rules, with more 
strict requirements 
Not allowed.  Not Allowed  Mutual and unilateral recognition 
and harmonization of standards   51
Name  Approach to Liberalization  Anti-Dumping  Countervailing 
Duties  Safeguards  Technical Standards 
 
Singapore - United States 
Free Trade Agreement 
(USSFTA) 
•  Positive list and schedule 
•  Tariff elimination in 10 years at the 
most (depending on the staging 
category) 
•  New products/services can be 





Allowed under domestic 
law principles. 




Enhance cooperation in 
standards, certification and 
conformity assessments 
Thailand - Australia Free 
Trade Agreement (TAFTA) 
•  Positive list and schedule 
•  Tariff elimination by 2010 
•  Calls for consultations in order to 
accelerate the schedule 
WTO Agreement on  
Implementation of 
WTO  
Art VI.  Time frame: 
12 months  
(6 for seasonal prods) 
Accepted, following WTO 
principles. 
Accepted, for up to two 
years.  
Special provisions for 
agricultural products. 
SPS: comply with WTO 
obligations, work towards 
harmonization and setting up a 
Experts Group. TBT: same. 
Thailand - India Framework 
Agreement for establishing a 
FTA 
•  There is an early harvest scheme 
with products to be liberalized in 
2004. 
n.a. n.a.  n.a.  n.a. 
Thailand-Laos Preferential 
Agreement 
•  n.a.  n.a. n.a.  n.a.  n.a. 
Thailand - New Zealand 
Closer Economic 
Partnership Agreement 
•  Positive List 
•  Upon entry into force, New Zealand 
will eliminate duties on 5,878 Thai 
products while Thailand will do the 
same for 2,978 export items 
•  New Zealand will scrap duties on 
another 697 items by 2010, and on 
858 products on the sensitive list 
including textiles, clothing and 






for bilateral safeguards 
Calls for harmonization   52
Name  Approach to Liberalization  Anti-Dumping  Countervailing 
Duties  Safeguards  Technical Standards 
 
•  Tariff elimination by 2014 






Singapore, New Zealand and 
Chile) 
•  Negative approach  Following WTO  Following WTO  Following WTO  Calls for cooperation 







•  Positive List 
•  Tariff elimination by 2005 
•  Every year, new products can be 
included in the no-tariff list (every 
October 1st) 
Parties commit to not 
applying them on 
each other's goods 
Parties commit to not 
applying them on each 
other's goods 
n.a. n.a. 





•  Positive list, can be reviewed 
annually 
•  Tariff elimination by 2006 
n.a. n.a.  n.a.  n.a. 





•  Positive List 
•  Tariff elimination in 5 or 7 years 
(particularly for tariff-quotas) 
•  Accelerated elimination possible 
through consultation 
WTO commitments  WTO commitments  Allowed, maximum 3 
years 
Cooperation for harmonization   53
Name  Approach to Liberalization  Anti-Dumping  Countervailing 
Duties  Safeguards  Technical Standards 
 
Korea - Chile Free Trade 
Agreement 
 
•  Positive List 
•  Tariff elimination in 0, 5, or 10 years 
according to schedule (some 
exceptions up to 13 years) 
•  Accelerated tariff elimination 
through consultation 
 
Subject to GATT Art 
VI 
 
Subject to GATT Art VI 
 




SOUTHEAST ASIA (Under Negotiation) 
Malaysia – Japan Economic 
Partnership Agreement  
•  Positive list 
•  Tariff elimination schedule varies for 
every product  group, maximum 10 
years 
•  There is an Early Harvest Schedule 
 
n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a. 
Philippines – Japan 
Economic Partnership 
Agreement 
•  Positive list 
•  Tariff reduction within 10 years of 
implementation 
n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  Mutual recognition 
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Appendix Table 3. Member’s Liberalization Index 
Weight Score Category
Measures covering trade in agriculture
0.003 Technical barriers to trade
0.00 No provisions
0.10                      Initiatives to promote the harmonisation of standards
0.20                      Provisions that require notification to a committee, review and/or
examination
0.40                      National treatment of standards
0.70                      Voluntary recognition of test results
1.00                      Harmonisation of standards
0.006 Export incentives
0.00 No provisions
0.50                      Provisions to review and exam
1.00                      Provisions that prohibit export incentives
0.002 Safeguards
0.00 Safeguard provisions
0.50                      No provisions
1.00                      Safeguard provisions are prohibited
0.002 Safeguards conditions - time limit
0.00 Safeguard provisions specify no time limit for the measure
0.25                      Safeguard provisions that permit safeguards to be in place for two
years or more
0.50                      Safeguard provisions that permit safeguards to be in place for one
year
0.75                      Safeguard provisions that permit safeguards to be in place for less
than one year
1.00                      No safeguard provisions
0.002 Safeguards conditions - type of measure
0.00 Safeguard provisions permit any measure to be used
0.75                      Safeguard provisions specify the type of measure - quotas or
suspension of preferences
1.00                      No safeguard provisions
0.006 Anti-dumping and countervailing measures
0.00 No restriction on the use of anti-dumping and countervailing measures
0.50                      Requires consultations with other members before anti-dumping or
countervailing measures can be imposed
0.75                      Anti-dumping and countervailing measures can be imposed provided
they are consistent with WTO rules
1.00                      Anti-dumping and countervailing measures are prohibited between
members
0.004 Years remaining in tariff reduction schedules as at 1 January
2001 for agriculture
0.00 No provision to reduce tariffs
0.10                      Continuing reductions until 1 January 2008
0.20                      Continuing reductions until 1 January 2007
0.30                      Continuing reductions until 1 January 2006
0.40                      Continuing reductions until 1 January 2005
0.50                      Continuing reductions until 1 January 2004
0.60                      Continuing reductions until 1 January 2003
0.70                      Continuing reductions until 1 January 2002
0.80                      Continuing reductions until 1 January 2002
1.00                      Provisions that abolished tariffs on commencement or tariffs have
been eliminated
Source: Adams, R., et.al., 2003. Trade and Investment effects of preferential trading arrangements, 
Productivity Commission Working paper, Canberra, Australia. May.  
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Appendix Table 3a. Construction of Member Liberalization Index (MLI) 
Weight Score Category
Measures covering trade in agriculture
0.017 Tariff quotas
0.00 No provision to liberalise agriculture
0.25                      Agreement does not permit the expansion of tariff quotas
0.50                      Agreement allows for the expansion of some tariff quotas
0.75                      Agreement allows for the expansion of all tariff quotas
0.25                      Subtract this score if preferences are received by only one party
0.90                      No provisions relating to tariff quotas
1.00                      Tariff quotas are prohibited
0.018 Domestic support
0.00 Agreement allows for the use of WTO "blue box" measures between
members
0.10                      Agreement allows for the use of WTO "amber box" measures between
members
0.30                      Agreement allows for the use of WTO "green box" measures between
members
0.90                      No provision relating to domestic support
1.00                      Domestic support is prohibited
0.010 Tariff exceptions for those PTAs with tariff reduction schedules
as at 1 January 2001
0.00 Exception list for agriculture
0.50                      Variable tariff rates for agriculture
1.00                      No exceptions list for agriculture
0.002 Number of different types of rules of origin available
0.00 One rule is available
0.25                      Two rules are available
0.50                      Three rules are available
0.75                      Four rules are available
1.00                      No rules of origin
0.003 Coverage of rules of origin for agriculture
0.00 The rules of origin are applied differently for different agricultural
products
1.00                      The rules of origin are applied to all agricultural products
0.01 Restrictiveness of the rules of origin
0.00 60 per cent value added component or the equivalent change in tariff
heading, substantial transformation or specific process
0.10                      55 per cent value added component or the equivalent change in tariff
heading, substantial transformation or specific process
0.20                      50 per cent value added component or the equivalent change in tariff
heading, substantial transformation or specific process
0.30                      45 per cent value added component or the equivalent change in tariff
heading, substantial transformation or specific process
0.40                      40 per cent value added component or the equivalent change in tariff
heading, substantial transformation or specific process
0.50                      35 per cent value added component or the equivalent change in tariff
heading, substantial transformation or specific process
0.60                      30 per cent value added component or the equivalent change in tariff
heading, substantial transformation or specific process
1.00                      No rules of origin
0.015 Sanitary and phytosanitary measures
0.00 No provisions
0.25                      Mutual recognition of SPS measures
0.50                      Provisions require the adoption of international standards, but permit
the implementation of more stringent science-based measures
1.00                      Provisions require the adoption of international standards
0.100 Total weight for measures on trade in agriculture
Source: Adams, R., et.al., 2003. Trade and Investment effects of preferential trading arrangements, 
Productivity Commission Working paper, Canberra, Australia. May.    56
Appendix Table 4.  Annexes – China-ASEAN 
 
The Early Harvest Programme shall be implemented no later than 1 January 2004 as follows: 
 
i.)  China and ASEAN 6: 
a. For China and ASEAN 6, this refers to all products with applied MFN tariff rates higher than 15%. For newer 
ASEAN Member States, this refers to all products with applied MFN tariff rates of 30% or higher. 
b. For China and ASEAN 6, this refers to all products with applied MFN tariff rates between 5% (inclusive) and 15% 
(inclusive). For the newer ASEAN Member States, this refers to all products with applied MFN tariff rates 
between 15% (inclusive) and 30% (exclusive) 
c. For China and ASEAN 6, this refers to all products with applied MFN tariff rates lower than 5%. For the newer 
ASEAN Member States, this refers to all products with applied MFN tariff rates lower than 15% 
 
 
ii.)  the newer ASEAN Member States: 
 








than 1 Jan 
2005 
Not later 
than 1 Jan 
2006 
Not later 




than 1 Jan 
2008 
Not later 
than 1 Jan 
2009 
Not later 
than 1 Jan 
2010 


















Cambodia -  -  20% 15% 10%  5%  0% 
 








than 1 Jan 
2005 
Not later 
than 1 Jan 
2006 
Not later 
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Not later 
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Not later 
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